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德拉吉的这次演讲竟引来了特朗普的赞许

欧洲央行行长德拉吉2019年6月18日在辛特拉的讲话中提到,如果通胀持续回归目标受到威胁,就需要额外的刺激。

译|智堡 陆雅珉

Central banks were often established in the past with the aim of bringing stability in the aftermath of historic episodes. The Bank of England was established during the sovereign debt crisis of 1690, when the government was unable to obtain funding in the market. The Federal Reserve was created after a series of panics that had rocked the US banking system in the late 19th and early 20th century.

过去,建立央行的目的往往是在历史事件之后带来稳定。英国央行成立于1690年的主权债务危机期间,当时政府在市场上无法获得融资。美联储是在19世纪末20世纪初的一系列恐慌冲击美国银行体系后成立的。

The euro was introduced 20 years ago in response to repeated episodes of exchange-rate instability and the need to secure the Single Market against competitive devaluations. The ECB was established as the keystone of the new Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

为了应对反复出现的汇率不稳定,以及确保单一市场不受竞争性贬值影响的需要,欧元在20年前得以引入。欧洲央行是新经济与货币联盟(EMU)的基石。

The first decade of the Monetary Union was characterised by calm macroeconomic conditions, with limited volatility and steady economic growth. The second decade, however, has seen profound shifts in the prevailing environment – including both financial and sovereign debt crises – and our monetary policy strategy has had to adapt with it.

欧洲货币联盟成立后的头十年,宏观经济形势平静,波动性有限,经济增长稳定。然而,第二个十年见证了当前环境的深刻变化——包括金融和主权债务危机——而我们的货币政策战略也不得不与之相适应。

I would like to discuss this morning why this evolution came about and how it was achieved – and what the past twenty years can tell us about the ECB’s monetary policy in the future.

今天上午,我想讨论一下为什么会出现这种演变,它是如何实现的,以及过去20年欧洲央行未来的货币政策能告诉我们什么。

注:欧洲央行行长德拉吉的任期将于2019年10月结束,德国央行行长魏德曼很有可能成为继任者。关于魏德曼的观点,可以参考智堡往期文章:《谁将接管欧洲央行?热门人选魏德曼观点整理》

Monetary policy before the crisis

危机前的货币政策

The ECB’s mandate is given by the Treaty as price stability. In 1998, the Governing Council defined price stability as inflation within a range of 0-2% over the medium term, which constitutes the ECB’s objective. Then, in 2003, the Governing Council clarified that, within this range, it would aim at a focal point of below, but close to, 2%, which remains our medium-term aim to this day. This was a formulation that differed from the standard inflation-targeting framework of the time, which was typically based around a point target for inflation. But there were sound reasons why this definition was put in place.

条约赋予欧洲央行稳定物价的使命。1998年,欧洲央行管理委员会将物价稳定定义为中期通胀率在0-2%之间,这是欧洲央行的目标。然后,在2003年,理事会澄清说,在这一范围内,它的目标将是一个低于但接近2%的通胀,这是我们至今的中期目标。这一构想不同于当时的标准通胀目标框架,当时的标准通胀目标通常是围绕一个通胀点位目标制定的。但这一定义是有充分理由的。

In common with central banks across the world, the ECB faced a macroeconomic environment before the crisis that was predominantly defined by low volatility and moderate shocks, with the distribution of shocks to inflation almost exclusively to the upside. In the euro area, HICP energy prices rose by 80% between January 1999 and September 2008. Under these conditions, establishing a strong reaction function against high inflation was seen as crucial to anchor inflation expectations. Emphasising an aim of “below, but close to, 2%” was seen to imply a stronger commitment than a standard inflation-targeting regime.

与世界各国央行一样,欧洲央行在危机前面临的宏观经济环境主要是低波动性和温和冲击,通胀冲击的分布几乎完全集中在上行。在欧元区,HICP能源价格在1999年1月到2008年9月期间上涨了80%。在这种情况下,建立强有力的反高通胀反应函数被视为锚定通胀预期的关键。强调“低于,但接近2%”的目标被认为意味着比标准的通胀目标制更坚定的承诺。

But monetary policy in the euro area also faced a special challenge. The ECB was a new central bank operating in a very heterogeneous monetary union, which created a particular imperative to establish inflation credibility. Establishing a commitment to controlling inflation was seen as critical to cement lower inflation expectations across the euro area – especially as moderate inflation was a relatively new phenomenon in several Member States.

但欧元区的货币政策也面临着特殊的挑战。欧洲央行是一家新成立的央行,在一个非常多元化的货币联盟中运作,这就特别需要建立通胀可信度。建立控制通胀的承诺被视为巩固整个欧元区较低通胀预期的关键——尤其是在几个成员国中,温和通胀是相对较新的现象。

注:关于通胀目标,可以参考智堡往期文章《智堡学堂:英国央行诠释通胀目标制》《什么是平均通胀目标制?》

Over the two decades up to 1999, inflation had averaged above 3% in 10 of the 12 original members. The decline in inflation in many countries in the run-up to EMU was in large part due to expectations of joining, as well as to a number of extraordinary actions taken by national authorities to meet the convergence criteria. From 1989-99, long-term inflation expectations had fallen from a range of between 2.5-4.5% in the four largest euro area economies to below 2% across the board. It was now the task of the new central bank to lock in this moderate-inflation environment – and it did so successfully. Over the next decade, inflation expectations internalised the ECB’s commitment to keep inflation down and remained below 2%.

在截至1999年的20年里,12个成员国中有10个的平均通胀率超过了3%。在欧洲货币联盟成立前夕,许多国家通胀率的下降在很大程度上是由于对加入的预期,以及各国当局为满足趋同标准而采取的一系列非常规行动。从1989年到1999年,欧元区四大经济体的长期通胀预期从2.5-4.5%下降到2%以下,之后新央行的任务是锁定这种温和通胀环境——而且它做得很成功。在接下来的十年里,通胀预期将欧洲央行压低通胀的承诺内在化,并保持在2%以下。

But this process of building inflation credibility had implications for the ECB’s reaction function. As a matter of accounting, stabilising headline inflation largely caused by its volatile components must mean that core inflationadjusts downwards. Rolling cross-correlations between energy inflation and core inflation show that an episode of high energy inflation between 1999 and 2007 was accompanied by a period of rapidly softening core inflation.[1] As a result, between January 1999 and September 2008 headline inflation in the euro area averaged 2.35%, while core inflation averaged 1.7% and exceeded 2% less than 15% of the time.

但这一建立通胀可信度的过程,对欧洲央行的反应函数产生了影响。要想稳定主要由其波动成分造成的总体通胀,必然意味着核心通胀向下调整。能源通胀与核心通胀之间的滚动相关性表明,1999年至2007年期间的高能源通胀,伴随着一段核心通胀迅速放缓的时期。因此,从1999年1月到2008年9月,欧元区整体通胀率平均为2.35%,而核心通胀率平均为1.7%,超过2%的时间不到15%。

Central banks in other advanced economies faced similar challenges and adopted similar strategies. But differences in mandates – and length of track records in fighting inflation – led to differences in how much energy price pass-through to headline inflation others were comfortable accommodating. For example, energy prices in the US CPI rose by 160% over the same period[2] and headline inflation averaged 2.9%. The Federal Reserve reacted less to headline inflation, and core CPI inflation averaged 2.2%.[3]

其他发达经济体的央行也面临类似的挑战,并采取了类似的策略。但目标的不同——以及对抗通胀的历史记录的长度——导致能源价格在多大程度上传导至总体通胀方面存在差异,而其他人则乐于接受这一点。例如,同期美国能源价格指数上涨160%,总体通胀率平均为2.9%。美联储对整体通胀的反应更少,核心CPI的平均涨幅为2.2%。

The upshot was that the euro area entered the crisis having succeeded in establishing its anti-inflation credentials, but with underlying inflation dynamics that were perhaps relatively weaker. This was not immediately apparent, as inflation stayed at fairly elevated levels for more than four years after the Lehman crash. Monetary policy responded decisively to the global financial crisis and disinflationary threats seemed to pass quickly.

结果是,欧元区在进入危机时成功地确立了其反通胀的信誉,但潜在的通胀动力可能相对较弱。这并没有立即显现出来,因为在雷曼兄弟破产后的4年多里,通胀一直处于相当高的水平。货币政策对全球金融危机做出了果断反应,抑制通胀的威胁似乎很快就过去了。

But in hindsight it seems reasonable to conclude that the inflation process was vulnerable to a shift in the environment – which is what transpired from around mid-2012 onwards.

但事后看来,似乎有理由得出这样的结论:通胀过程容易受到环境变化的影响——2012年年中前后的情况就是如此。

New challenges for monetary policy

货币政策面临新的挑战

At this point, headline inflation in the euro area began what was, in retrospect, a prolonged downward drift, and core inflation fell by almost a percentage point from mid-2012 to early 2014. There are two factors that help explain the switch to a disinflationary trend.

从那时起,欧元区的整体通胀开始了一段漫长的下行趋势,从2012年年中到2014年初,核心通胀下降了近一个百分点。有两个因素有助于解释转向反通胀趋势的原因。

First, the distribution of shocks to inflation moved strongly to the downside and the amplitude of the shocks increased. Supply-side shocks gradually dissipated over the years following the Lehman crash and the sovereign debt crisis. Negative demand shocks, driven at different times by domestic demand and external demand, instead became the dominant source of macroeconomic fluctuations in the euro area. ECB analysis shows that negative demand shocks have weighed on euro-area inflation by more than 1 percentage point on average since the start of the crisis. In the previous ten years, their effect was neutral overall, with periods of both upward and downward pressure.[4]

首先,通胀冲击的分布强烈下行,冲击的幅度加大。在雷曼兄弟破产和主权债务危机之后的多年里,供给侧的冲击逐渐消退。负的需求冲击,在不同时期由国内需求和外部需求驱动,反而成为欧元区宏观经济波动的主要来源。欧洲央行的分析显示,自危机开始以来,负面需求冲击对欧元区通胀的平均压力超过了1个百分点。在过去的十年里,影响总体上中性的,有上升和下降的压力。

The second factor was a change in the macroeconomic policy mix. While in the first phase of the crisis fiscal and monetary policy had eased in tandem – with fiscal policy loosening by a total of about 3% of potential GDP between 2008 and 2010[5] – thereafter the stance of monetary and fiscal policy decoupled. The euro area fiscal stance turned contractionary in response to the sovereign debt crisis, tightening by around 4 percentage points of potential GDP until 2013 – years the euro area was mostly in recession.

第二个因素是宏观经济政策组合的变化。尽管在危机的第一阶段,财政和货币政策已同步放松——2008年至2010年期间,财政政策总共放松了约占潜在GDP的3%——但此后,货币和财政政策的立场已分化。作为对主权债务危机的回应,欧元区的财政立场转向紧缩,到2013年,占潜在GDP的比例收紧了约4个百分点,而2013年欧元区基本上处于衰退之中。

This stands in contrast to the United States, where fiscal policy eased more in the initial phase of the crisis, by about 6.5% of potential GDP in total over 2008-09, and then tightened by about 5.5% of potential GDP from 2011 to 2013 when the economic recovery was underway. The euro area was forced onto a different path by the need in some countries to re-establish fiscal credibility. But on aggregate the euro area did not have less fiscal space than the United States: public debt levels were similar in the two jurisdictions. The key difference was that fiscal stabilisation in the United States took place at the federal level, while the euro area lacked a central fiscal instrument to act counter-cyclically.

这与美国形成了鲜明对比,美国在危机初期放松了更多的财政政策,在2008年至2009年期间,财政政策占潜在GDP的6.5%左右,在2011年至2013年经济复苏期间,财政政策占潜在GDP的5.5%左右。由于一些国家需要重建财政信誉,欧元区被迫走上了一条不同的道路。但总的来说,欧元区的财政空间并不比美国小:两者的公共债务水平相当。关键的不同之处在于,美国的财政稳定是在联邦层面进行的,而欧元区缺乏一个中央财政工具来采取逆周期行动。

The policy mix is also relevant when it comes to financial sector policies. After the crisis, it was inevitable that banking sectors in advanced economies would have to deleverage, both to cover losses and to re-focus their business models. The United States ensured that this process happened quickly and early. Around 500 failing banks were resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, while struggling banks were stress-tested and recapitalised through the Troubled Assets Relief Program. Between 2008 and 2011, US banks improved their leverage ratio[6] by 1.6 percentage points from 7.2 to 8.8%.

当涉及到金融业政策时,政策组合也很重要。危机过后,发达经济体的银行业不可避免地将不得不去杠杆化,既要弥补损失,又要重新调整业务模式。美国确保这一进程迅速和尽早地进行。美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)解决了约500家倒闭银行的问题,而陷入困境的银行则接受了压力测试,并通过问题资产救助计划(TARP)进行了资本重组。在2008年至2011年间,美国银行的杠杆率提高了1.6个百分点,从7.2%升至8.8%。

The response in the euro area was more sluggish. Despite being more levered than their US peers before the crisis, euro area banks improved their leverage ratio by just 0.9 percentage points, from 3.7 to 4.6%, and this was achieved more through shedding assets and less through raising capital.[7] This in part reflected the fact that, due to the fiscal rules, public support for banks was concentrated in countries with fiscal space. Moreover, without a common resolution framework only around 50 banks were resolved in the euro area in this period.[8] So a weak banking sector continued to drag on the euro area economy, which was especially pernicious given the importance of the banking lending channel for financing.

欧元区的反应更为迟缓。尽管欧元区银行的杠杆率在危机前高于美国同行,但它们的杠杆率仅提高了0.9个百分点,从3.7个百分点升至4.6%,而这更多是通过减持资产实现的,而不是通过筹集资本实现的。这在一定程度上反映了这样一个事实:由于财政规则,公众对银行的支持主要集中在有财政空间的国家。此外,在没有共同清算框架的情况下,欧元区在此期间只清算了大约50家银行。因此,疲弱的银行业继续拖累欧元区经济,鉴于银行贷款渠道对融资的重要性,这尤其有害。

In sum, the ECB faced an environment where there was both an increasing need to counter demand shocks, and an increasing burden on monetary policy to do so. Our strategy therefore had to adapt to these new circumstances in order to continue delivering our aim.

总而言之,欧洲央行面临的环境是,对抗需求冲击的需求越来越大,而货币政策的负担也越来越重。因此,我们的战略必须适应这些新的情况,以便继续实现我们的目标。

Monetary policy responded first in the summer of 2012 by acting to defuse the sovereign debt crisis, which had evolved from a tail risk for inflation into a material threat to price stability. Announcing Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) established our commitment to counter unwarranted redenomination risks in sovereign debt markets and acted as a powerful circuit breaker.

2012年夏天,货币政策首先做出回应,采取行动化解主权债务危机。这场危机已从通胀的尾部风险演变为对价格稳定的实质性威胁。直接货币交易(OMT)的宣布确立了我们应对主权债务市场不必要的重新计价风险的承诺,并起到了强大的断路器作用。

While OMT was never activated, the effect of its announcement was equivalent to that of a large-scale asset purchase programme: spreads in vulnerable countries fell on average by more than 400 basis points over the next two years. The macroeconomic impact of OMT was also analogous to other purchase programmes: ECB research finds that the GDP and price effects of OMT were broadly in line with those estimated for the QE that took place in the United States and the United Kingdom.[9]

尽管OMT从未启动,但其宣布的效果相当于一项大规模资产购买计划:在未来两年,脆弱国家的利差平均下降逾400个基点。OMT对宏观经济的影响也类似于其他购买计划:欧洲央行的研究发现,OMT对GDP和价格的影响与美国和英国量化宽松的估计大致相符。

But the lingering effects of the sovereign debt crisis dented the capacity of this stimulus to counter the new disinflationary trend. The delayed bank deleveraging process in the euro area began to accelerate, with banks further shrinking their balance sheets and paying back central bank loans. Bank balance sheets declined by around 20 percentage points of GDP in 2013 alone and, at the end of 2013, credit growth to the private sector was contracting at a rate of 2.4% relative to a year earlier. On the demand side, risk appetite in the private sector collapsed, with investment subtracting 1.6 percentage points from GDP growth in 2012.

但主权债务危机的持续影响削弱了这一刺激计划对抗新的反通胀趋势的能力。欧元区推迟的银行去杠杆化进程开始加速,银行进一步收缩资产负债表,偿还央行贷款。仅在2013年,银行资产负债表占GDP比例就下降了约20个百分点,2013年底,私人部门的信贷增长同比收缩2.4%。在需求方面,私人部门的风险偏好大幅下降,2012年投资对GDP增长的贡献率为-1.6%。

The ECB therefore reacted again in 2013 by cutting its main refinancing rate twice, from 0.75% to 0.25%, and by seizing the opportunity of the launch of European banking supervision. We carried out a comprehensive assessment of bank balance sheets, with the aim of steering the process of balance sheet repair towards a positive macroeconomic outcome. Banks strengthened their balance sheets by over €200 billion in advance of the outcome.[10] That put the banking sector in a much stronger position to transmit our policy.

因此,欧洲央行在2013年再次做出反应,两次下调主要再融资利率,从0.75%下调至0.25%,并抓住了启动欧洲银行监管的机会。我们对银行资产负债表进行了全面评估,旨在引导资产负债表修复进程朝着积极的宏观经济结果迈进。在结果公布之前,银行的资产负债表已经增加了2000多亿欧元。这使得银行部门在传达我们的政策时处于更有利的地位。

But at this point, the euro area economy was hit by a further downward shock to inflation in the form of a 60% collapse in oil prices in mid-2014, which pushed inflation into negative territory. With underlying inflation already weakening, inflation expectations began to be affected. As the scope for further interest rate cuts was now limited, it became increasingly clear that our reaction function needed to evolve to address these new challenges.

但那时欧元区经济受到了通胀进一步下降的冲击,2014年年中油价暴跌60%,将通胀推至负值。随着潜在通胀已经走弱,通胀预期开始受到影响。由于进一步降息的空间有限,越来越明显的是,我们的反应函数需要进化,以应对这些新的挑战。

Indeed, since our policy framework had never been systematically tested by persistent disinflationary risks, the ECB had not yet had a chance to demonstrate its intolerance for inflation remaining below its aim for protracted periods of time.

事实上,由于我们的政策框架从未受到持续的反通胀风险的系统性检验,欧洲央行尚未有机会证明,它不能容忍通胀长期低于其目标。

At the same time, there appeared to be some uncertainty about which tools we would be able to deploy if the effective lower bound were reached. Unlike in other major economies, the ECB had not resorted to large-scale asset purchases during the global financial crisis and its aftermath. Some even questioned the legality of asset purchases in Europe and their effectiveness in our bank-based economy.

与此同时,如果达到有效利率下限,我们将能够动用哪些工具似乎存在一些不确定性。与其它主要经济体不同,欧洲央行在全球金融危机期间及其余波期间没有大规模购买资产。一些人甚至质疑欧洲资产购买的合法性,以及它们在我们以银行为基础的经济中的有效性。

If these uncertainties were not removed, there was a material risk that falling inflation could become self-fulfilling: the public could begin expecting a smaller monetary policy response to future inflation undershoots, and revise their inflation expectations further downwards.

如果不消除这些不确定性,通胀下降就有可能自我实现的重大风险:公众可能开始预期,针对未来通胀低于预期的情况,货币政策的反应会更小,并进一步下调通胀预期。

In other words, credibility now relied not just on perceptions of the ECB’s commitment to our aim, but also on perceptions of our capability to fight low inflation. We responded to the situation in three main ways.

换句话说,可信度现在不仅取决于人们对欧洲央行对目标承诺的看法,还取决于人们对欧洲央行抗击低通胀能力的看法。我们对形势的反应主要有三方面。

The ECB’s policy response

欧洲央行的政策应对

The first was by clarifying the symmetry of our aim. While the quantitative definition of price stability was instrumental in establishing credibility in the first decade, its asymmetric formulation may have led to misperceptions in a low-inflation environment. Thus we made clear that our policy aim was fully symmetric,[11] and it was symmetric around the level that we had established in 2003: below, but close to, 2%. It is achieving this aim over the medium term that steers our policy decisions.

首先是澄清我们目标的对称性。虽然价格稳定的定量定义有助于在头十年建立可信度,但其不对称的表述可能导致在低通胀环境下的误解。因此,我们明确表示,我们的政策目标是完全对称的,它围绕着我们在2003年建立的水平对称:低于但接近2%。正是在中期实现这一目标,引导着我们的政策决策。

In addition, we clarified that symmetry meant not only that we would not accept persistently low inflation, but also that there was no cap on inflation at 2%. As I emphasised on a number of occasions,[12] our medium-term orientation implies that inflation can deviate from our aim in both directions, so long as the path of inflation converges back towards that focal point over the medium-term policy horizon.

此外,我们还澄清说,对称性不仅意味着我们不会接受持续的低通胀,而且也意味着没有2%的通胀上限。正如我在许多场合所强调的那样,我们的中期目标意味着,只要通货膨胀的路径在中期政策范围内收敛,通货膨胀就可能在两个方向偏离我们的目标。

The second part of our response was to lay out the tools we would use to counteract downside inflation risks, which began with a speech I gave in Amsterdam in April 2014 that described three contingencies and the instruments we would use to react to them. This established unambiguously that we had no taboos about resorting to unconventional measures.[13] There was nothing institutionally or legally special about the euro area that prohibited monetary policy from adding accommodation once the lower bound was approached.

我们应对的第二部分是,列出我们将用来抵消下行通胀风险的工具。我于2014年4月在阿姆斯特丹发表的一篇演讲,开篇就描述了三种突发事件,以及我们将用来应对它们的工具。这明确表明,我们对采取非常规措施没有任何禁忌。欧元区在制度和法律上没有什么特别禁止货币政策在接近下限时增加宽松政策。

Third, as these various contingencies played out, we operationalised our reaction function by launching a series of new instruments. We broke through the zero bound by lowering our deposit rate into negative territory, launched our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) to provide incentives for banks to lend, and implemented a large-scale asset purchase programme (APP) of public and private securities. These measures were deliberately designed to work as a package and ease the stance through complementary channels, working both through banks and the wider matrix of capital markets.

第三,随着各种突发事件的发生,我们启动了一系列新工具,使我们的反应函数得以运作。我们突破零利率限制,将存款利率降至负值,推出定向长期再融资操作(TLTROs),鼓励银行放贷,并实施了大规模的公共和私人证券资产购买计划(APP)。这些措施是经过精心设计的,目的是作为一揽子措施发挥作用,并通过相互补充的渠道——既通过银行,也通过更广泛的资本市场矩阵——来缓解这种局面。

The negative rate policy challenged market expectations that when rates reached zero they could only go up and not down, which helped skew the distribution of rate expectations and depress the short end of the risk-free curve – a key benchmark for the pricing of bank loans. Asset purchases in tandem compressed yields at the longer end of the curve, pushing down mortgage rates and, at the same time, making bank lending to firms more attractive in risk-adjusted terms. And bank-based transmission was amplified by the TLTROs, which lowered funding costs and increased competition among banks.

负利率政策挑战了市场的预期,即当利率达到零时,利率只能上升而不能下降,这有助于扭曲利率预期的分布,压低无风险曲线的短端——银行贷款定价的一个关键基准。资产购买同时压缩了较长期债券的收益率,推低了抵押贷款利率,同时使银行向企业提供的贷款在风险调整后更具吸引力。TLTRO降低了融资成本,增加了银行间的竞争,从而扩大了基于银行的货币政策传输。

Over time, we also enhanced this framework with state- and date-based forward guidance[14], allowing us to rotate the marginal tool for determining the policy stance from asset purchases to forward guidance as the economic outlook improved. Today, this forward guidance links our expectations on the path of future rates to the path of inflation towards our aim, leading to automatic easing if the convergence path towards 2% is delayed.

随着时间的推移,我们还通过基于状态和日期的前瞻指引增强了这一框架,使我们能够随着经济前景的改善,将决定政策立场的边际工具从资产购买转向前瞻指引。如今,这一前瞻指引将我们对未来利率走势的预期与通胀朝向目标的路径联系起来,如果向2%收敛的趋势被推迟,就会自动宽松。

There is mounting evidence that these instruments have been effective.[15] Negative rates have proven to be a very important tool in the euro area – and more so than they would have been in an economy like the United States. Indeed, the Federal Reserve eschewed negative rates in part due to concerns about their effects on the money market industry, which are key intermediaries in the US financial system. But this factor is less relevant in the euro area, since many money market funds have been operating as Variable Net Asset Value funds, and therefore are more flexible to extend duration to seek additional returns.

越来越多的证据表明,这些手段是有效的。事实证明,负利率在欧元区是一个非常重要的工具,比在美国这样的经济体中更为重要。事实上,美联储之所以避免负利率,部分原因是担心负利率对货币市场行业的影响。货币市场是美国金融体系的关键中介。但这一因素在欧元区不太重要,因为许多货币市场基金一直以可变净资产价值基金的形式运作,因此在延长久期以寻求额外回报方面更具灵活性。

Furthermore, the euro area is a relatively open economy for its size, with total trade making up 51% of GDP,[16] compared with 27% in the United States. This means that the impact of negative rates on inflation and financing conditions via the exchange rate is more powerful.

此外,就其规模而言,欧元区是一个相对开放的经济体,贸易总额占GDP的51%,而美国为27%。这意味着负利率通过汇率对通胀和融资条件的影响更大。

In short, faced with a new environment of downside risks and limited conventional policy space, the ECB showed that it had no shortage of tools available to respond. Unconventional measures proved suitable substitutes for conventional ones: using market prices to construct a so-called “shadow short rate”,[17] the stimulus provided appears broadly in line with the recommendation of monetary policy rules as suggested by recent academic research.[18]

简而言之,面对下行风险和传统政策空间有限的新环境,欧洲央行表明,它并不缺乏可用的应对工具。事实证明,非常规措施是传统措施的合适替代品:利用市场价格构建所谓的“影子短期利率”,所提供的刺激措施与最近学术研究建议的货币政策规则基本一致。

Our capacity to react in this way was made possible by the flexibility embedded in our mandate – a flexibility that was confirmed by the recent ruling of the European Court of Justice. This not only affirmed that asset purchases are a legal instrument of monetary policy in the euro area, but emphasised the broad discretion of the ECB in using all our tools in a necessary and proportionate way to achieve our objective.

我们以这种方式作出反应的能力是由于我们目标中所包含的灵活性- -欧洲法院最近的裁决证实了这种灵活性。这不仅肯定了资产购买是欧元区货币政策的合法工具,而且强调了欧洲央行在以必要且相称的方式使用我们所有工具以实现目标方面的广泛自由裁量权。

However, although we have seen the successful transmission of monetary policy to financing conditions, and from financing conditions to GDP and employment, the final legs of the transmission process to wages and inflation have been slower than we expected. Wage growth is now strengthening as slack in the labour market diminishes. But the pass-through from wages to prices remains weak. This may reflect structural changes, such as globalisation and digitalisation, which mostly have an impact at this point in the pricing chain. Lingering cyclical weakness can also delay wage-price pass-through as firms elect to squeeze margins rather than raise prices and risk losing market share.[19]

然而,尽管我们已经看到货币政策成功地传导到融资条件,并从融资条件传导到GDP和就业,但货币政策传导到工资和通胀的最后阶段比我们预期的要慢。随着劳动力市场松弛的缓解,工资增长正在加强。但从工资到价格的传递仍然疲弱。这可能反映出结构性变化,如全球化和数字化,这些变化目前大多对定价链产生影响。持续的周期性疲软也会推迟工资-价格传递,因为公司选择挤压利润而不是冒着失去市场份额的风险提高价格。

Current challenges for monetary policy

当前货币政策面临的挑战

In this environment, what matters is that monetary policy remains committed to its objective and does not resign itself to too-low inflation. And, as I emphasised at our last monetary policy meeting, we are committed, and are not resigned to having a low rate of inflation forever or even for now.

在这种环境下,重要的是货币政策仍致力于其目标,而不是屈从于过低的通胀。而且,正如我在上次货币政策会议上所强调的那样,我们承诺,而且不会永远、甚至暂时接受低通胀率。

We have described the overall orientation of our monetary policy as being “patient, persistent and prudent”. Patient, because faced with repeated negative shocks we have had to extend the policy horizon. Persistent, because monetary policy will remain sufficiently accommodative to ensure the sustained convergence of inflation to our aim. And prudent, because we will pay close attention to underlying inflation dynamics and to risks and will adjust policy appropriately.

我们把货币政策的总体取向描述为“耐心、坚持和审慎”。耐心,因为面对反复出现的负面冲击,我们不得不扩大政策视野。坚持,因为货币政策将保持足够的宽松,以确保通胀与我们的目标持续趋同。审慎,因为我们会密切关注潜在的通胀动态和风险,并适当调整政策。

This orientation is expressed in our current policy framework, which allows us to adapt our forward guidance and react flexibly as the macroeconomic situation evolves. That was illustrated by the monetary policy decisions taken at our meeting earlier in June.

这一方向体现在我们目前的政策框架中,它使我们能够调整我们的前瞻指引,并随着宏观经济形势的发展灵活作出反应。我们在6月初的会议上作出的货币政策决定就说明了这一点。

Looking forward, the risk outlook remains tilted to the downside, and indicators for the coming quarters point to lingering softness. The risks that have been prominent throughout the past year, in particular geopolitical factors, the rising threat of protectionism and vulnerabilities in emerging markets have not dissipated. The prolongation of risks has weighed on exports and in particular on manufacturing.

展望未来,风险前景仍倾向于下行,未来几个季度的指标显示经济依然疲软。过去一年一直突出的风险,特别是地缘政治因素、保护主义的威胁日益加剧以及新兴市场的脆弱性,尚未消散。风险的延长对出口造成了压力,尤其是对制造业。

In the absence of improvement, such that the sustained return of inflation to our aim is threatened, additional stimulus will be required.

如果没有改善,以致通货膨胀持续回到我们的目标受到威胁,就需要额外的刺激。

In our recent deliberations, the members of the Governing Council expressed their conviction in pursuing our aim of inflation close to 2% in a symmetric fashion. Just as our policy framework has evolved in the past to counter new challenges, so it can again. In the coming weeks, the Governing Council will deliberate how our instruments can be adapted commensurate to the severity of the risk to price stability.

在我们最近的校准中,管委会成员表达了他们的信念,即以对称的方式追求接近2%的通货膨胀目标。正如我们的政策框架在过去不断演变以应对新的挑战一样,它也可以再次演变。未来几周,欧洲央行管委会将审议如何调整我们的工具,使之与价格稳定风险的严重程度相称。

We remain able to enhance our forward guidance by adjusting its bias and its conditionality to account for variations in the adjustment path of inflation.

我们仍然能够通过调整其偏差和条件来加强我们的前瞻指引,以适应通货膨胀调整路径的变化。

This applies to all instruments of our monetary policy stance.

这适用于我们货币政策立场的所有工具。

Further cuts in policy interest rates and mitigating measures to contain any side effects remain part of our tools.

进一步降低政策利率和采取缓解措施以遏制任何副作用,仍是我们工具的一部分。

And the APP still has considerable headroom. Moreover, the Treaty requires that our actions are both necessary and proportionate to fulfil our mandate and achieve our objective, which implies that the limits we establish on our tools are specific to the contingencies we face. If the crisis has shown anything, it is that we will use all the flexibility within our mandate to fulfil our mandate – and we will do so again to answer any challenges to price stability in the future.

而且资产购买计划还有相当大的发展空间。此外,条约要求我们的行动是必要的和相称的,以完成任务并实现目标,这意味着我们对工具所规定的限制是针对我们所面临的紧急情况的。如果说这场危机显示了什么,那就是我们将利用职权范围内的所有灵活性来履行我们的职责——我们将再次这样做,以应对未来对价格稳定的任何挑战。

All these options were raised and discussed at our last meeting.

我们上次会议提出并讨论了所有这些选择。

What matters for our policy calibration is our medium-term policy aim: an inflation rate below, but close to, 2%. That aim is symmetric, which means that, if we are to deliver that value of inflation in the medium term, inflation has to be above that level at some time in the future.

对我们的政策校准来说,重要的是我们的中期政策目标:低于但接近2%的通胀。这个目标是对称的,这意味着,如果我们要在中期实现通胀目标,通胀必须在未来某个时候高于这个水平。

But fiscal policy should play its role. Over the last 10 years, the burden of macroeconomic adjustment has fallen disproportionately on monetary policy. We have even seen instances where fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical and countered the monetary stimulus.

但财政政策应该发挥作用。过去10年,宏观经济调整的负担不成比例地落在了货币政策上。我们甚至看到过财政政策顺周期并与货币刺激政策背道而驰的例子。

If the unbalanced macroeconomic policy-mix in the euro area in part explains the slide into disinflation, so a better policy mix can help bring it to a close. Monetary policy can always achieve its objective alone, but especially in Europe where public sectors are large, it can do so faster and with fewer side effects if fiscal policies are aligned with it.

如果欧元区不平衡的宏观经济政策组合在一定程度上解释了滑向通货紧缩的原因,那么更好的政策组合可以帮助结束通货紧缩。货币政策总是能够单独实现其目标,但在公共部门规模较大的欧洲,如果财政政策与货币政策相协调,货币政策可以更快实现目标,副作用也更少。

Recreating fiscal space by raising potential output through reforms and public investment, and respecting the European fiscal framework will maintain investor confidence in countries with high public debt, low growth and low fiscal space. But as fiscal expansion in the other countries may have limited spillovers, national fiscal policies remain constrained. So work on a common fiscal stabilisation instrument of adequate size and design should proceed with broader scope and renewed determination.

通过改革和公共投资提高潜在产出,重建财政空间,并尊重欧洲财政框架,将保持投资者对公共债务高、增长低、财政空间小的国家的信心。但由于其它国家财政扩张的溢出效应可能有限,各国财政政策仍受到限制。因此,制定一个规模和设计合理的共同财政稳定工具的工作,应该以更广泛的范围和新的决心推进。

Conclusion

结论

Let me conclude.

让我来总结。

The euro was introduced twenty years ago in order to insulate the Single Market from exchange-rate crises and competitive devaluations that would threaten the sustainability of open markets. It was also a political project that, relying on the success of the Single Market, would lead to the greater integration of its Member States.

20年前引入欧元是为了使单一市场免受汇率危机和竞争性贬值的影响,而这些危机和贬值将威胁到开放市场的可持续性。这也是一个政治项目,依靠单一市场的成功,将导致其成员国更大程度的一体化。

On both counts, the vision of our forefathers has scored relatively well. Imagine where the Single Market would be today, after the global financial crisis and rising protectionism, had all countries in Europe been free to adjust their exchange rates. Instead, our economies integrated, converged and coped with the most severe challenge since the Great Depression. That leads me to four observations.

在这两方面,我们前辈的愿景都取得了相对较好的成绩。想象一下,在全球金融危机和保护主义抬头之后,如果欧洲所有国家都能自由调整汇率,那么单一市场今天会变成什么样子。相反,我们的经济一体化、融合,并应对了自大萧条以来最严峻的挑战。这就引出了四点观察。

First, the integration of our economies and with it the convergence of our Member States has also greatly increased. Misalignments of real effective exchange rates between euro area countries are about a half those between advanced economies with flexible exchange-rates or countries linked by pegged exchange rates and they have fallen by around 20% in the second decade of EMU relative to the first.[20]

首先,我们各国经济的一体化及其各成员国的一体化也大大加强了。欧元区国家之间的实际有效汇率失调,大约是实行灵活汇率的发达经济体之间或实行钉住汇率制的国家之间实际有效汇率失调的一半,而且在欧洲货币联盟成立后的第二个十年里,这些国家的实际有效汇率相对于第一个十年下降了20%左右。

Second, the dispersion of growth rates across euro area countries, having fallen considerably since 1999, is since 2014 comparable to the dispersion across US states. Third, this has been driven in large part by the deepening of European value chains, with EMU countries now significantly more integrated with each other than the United States or China are with the rest of the world.[21] Most EMU countries export more with each other than with the US, China or Russia. Fourth, employment in the euro area has reached record highs and in all euro area countries but one stands above its 1999 level.

其次,欧元区国家自1999年以来的增长率差异已大幅下降,而自2014年以来,欧元区国家的增长率差异与美国各州相当。第三,这在很大程度上是由欧洲价值链的深化推动的。与美国或中国与世界其他地区的一体化程度相比,欧洲货币联盟成员国之间的一体化程度显著提高。大多数欧洲货币联盟成员国相互之间的出口都超过了对美国、中国和俄罗斯的出口。第四,欧元区和所有欧元区国家的就业都达到了历史新高,但有一个国家的就业水平高于1999年的水平。

But the remaining institutional weaknesses of our monetary union cannot be ignored at the cost of seriously damaging what has been achieved. Logic would suggest that the more integrated our economies become, the faster should be the completion of banking union and capital markets union, and the faster the transition from a rules-based system for fiscal policies to an institution-based fiscal capacity.

但不能忽视我们货币联盟仍存在的制度弱点,代价是严重破坏已经取得的成果。从逻辑上讲,我们的经济一体化程度越高,银行业联盟和资本市场联盟的完成速度就应该越快,财政政策从以规则为基础的体系向以机构为基础的财政能力的转变也应该越快。

The journey towards greater integration that our citizens and firms started twenty years ago has been long, far from finished, and with broad but uneven success. But overall, it has strengthened the conviction of our peoples that it is only through more Europe that the implications of this integration can be managed. For some, that trust may lie in a genuine faith in our common destiny, for others it comes from the appreciation of the greater prosperity so far achieved, for yet others that trust may be forced by the increased and unavoidable closeness of our countries. Be that as it may, that trust it is now the bedrock upon which our leaders can and will build the next steps of our EMU.

我们的公民和企业20年前开始的走向更大融合的征途漫长而远未结束,取得了广泛但不均衡的成功。但总的来说,它加强了我们人民的信念,即只有通过更多的欧洲才能管理这种一体化的影响。对一些人来说,这种信任可能存在于对我们共同命运的真诚信念之中;对另一些人来说,这种信任可能来自对迄今已取得的更大繁荣的赞赏;尽管如此,这种信任现在是我们的领导人能够、也将建立欧洲货币联盟下一步行动的基石。

来源:https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190618~ec4cd2443b.en.html

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